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COASE THEOREM SYMPOSIUM-PART II
THE COASE THEOREM AND
THE STUDY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
WARREN J. SAMUELS'
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive assessment
of the Coasian analysis, primarily through an interpretation of the
positive analytic meaning and significance of the so-called neutrality
theorem, the probative value of its normative message, and its place
in the study of law and economics. Among other things, the paper will
show that the theorem is a very limited partial-equilibrium proposition which concentrates upon certain variables to the exclusion of
others which dominate the actual operation of those included,
thereby giving effect to certain variables even while seemingly
abstracting from them. Thus, when all the important variables are
considered, the thrust of the theorem is shown to be not only
incomplete, imprecise and ambiguous, but also reversed.
For the purposes of this paper, the thrust of the Coasian argument
is taken to be both of the following:
1. Through the definition of property rights and the creation of
markets for externalities, opportunities for gains from trade can
lead to bargaining and the exchange of rights and thereby to the

internalization of the externalities; i.e., property rights and the
market as a solution for externalities;1

2. The allocation of resources is independent of property rights
and liability rules, i.e., the allocative neutrality of rights or the
2
Coase theorem proper.

The assumptions explicit and implicit in the Coase argument are
fairly well-known and stringent. They include the conventionally
*Professor of Economics, Michigan State University; Editor, Journal of Economic Issues.
1. W. Samuels, Welfare Economics, Power, and Property, in Perspectives of Property 204,
205 (Wunderlich & Gibson Jr. ed. 1972).
2. Id. at 128ff, 131, 132.
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recognized (e.g., zero transactions costs, clearly defined and transferable rights) as well as some not always explicitly stated 3 (e.g., zero
income elasticity of demand for modification of the externality and for
the commodity associated with the externality, absence of inflexible
capital constraints, inclusion of all implicit or opportunity costs in
firm decision making including side payments, etc.). In the discussion
below, additional considerations are raised which further severely
constrain the theorem and from which the Coasian analysis effectively
(albeit with debilitating results) abstracts by assumption.
The Coase theorem applies certain facets of Pareto optimal market
solutions to externalities. In fact, the language and reasoning used to
derive the Coase theorem, namely, maximizing the value of production, taking advantage of gains from trade, market efficiency and the
like, are precisely that of Pareto optimality. The Coase theorem,
following the reasoning of taking advantage of gains from trade and
market adjustments leading to maximization of the value of production, takes a very narrow characteristic of equilibrium and builds
upon it with very ambiguous positive and normative significance.
Among other things, both Pareto optimality and the Coase theorem
(whatever their logical relation) neglect the driving force of income
and wealth distribution in economic activity and the power play over
income and wealth distribution that takes place, including the
manipulation of property and liability rules for distributional effects
and the fact that manipulative capacity is a partial function of the
status quo power structure.
Hence, the allocation of resources contemplated by the theorem is
not a unique allocation, whether deemed Pareto optimal or not. The
allocation of resources is a function of and is specific to the power
structure that gives rise to it. 4 The allocation of resources is from
within the Pareto-domain or Pareto-set and is a function of the power
structure, particularly the structure of rights. 5 Property rights con3. A Randall, On the Theory of Market Solutions to Externality Problems, Oregon
Agricultural Experiment Station Special Report 351 (1972); A. Randall, Market Solutions to
Externality Problems: Theory and Practice,Am. J. Agricultural Econ. 175 (1972).
4. In this paper the same definitional system is used as in Samuels, supra note 1, at 63-67.
Specifically, by power is meant (1) effective participation in decision making, (2) the means or
capacity with which to exercise choice (participate in decision making) e.g., property, position,
rights in general. By coercion is meant the impact of the behavior and choices of others upon the
composition of one's opportunity set, a process which is reciprocal or mutual. It includes both
injuries and benefits visited through the action or choices of others (accordingly, externalities
may be defined as the substance of mutual coercion).
5. "The positions that qualify as Pareto-optimal depend always on the rules that constrain
individual behavior, and any change in the set of rules will change the boundaries of the
Paretian set." Buchanan & Stubblebine, Pareto-Optimalityand Gains-from-Trade: A Comment
39 Economica 203, 204 (1972). On multiple local maxima, see Baumol, On Taxation and the
Controlof Externalities,62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307, 321 (1972).
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strain the field of feasible outcomes, define the Pareto-domain, 6 and
govern the allocative outcomes' substantive composition. A change in
the structure of rights would bring about a change in the (optimal)
allocation of resources. The allocation of resources contemplated by
the Coase theorem is a function of the rights structure, partially
because the cost-price structure built into the cost functions (used by
Turvey to articulate the Coase theorem 7) is itself a function of the
rights structure. Moreover, the rights structure is a partial function of
the law. 8 The opportunities for trade contemplated by the Coase
theorem and its underlying argument are therefore a function of the
power and rights structure, 9 and the maximization of the value of
production is a function of, and gives effect to, the power and rights
structures. 10 The allocation of resources contemplated by the Coase
rule is in this fundamental respect not neutral with regard to legal
rights: market solutions are a function of rights and rights are a partial
function of the law. The Coase rule deals with liability rules, but
insofar as liability rules and changes in liability rules govern the
power and rights structures, the allocation of resources is not neutral
with regard to liability rules or rights in general. What becomes
important, accordingly, is the manner in which the identification and
appropriation of rights including liability assignments is undertaken
and the consequent distribution of rights (wealth)." Allocation is
specific to the underlying rights structure which gives rise to it.
Not only does the Coase theorem neglect the driving force of
income and wealth distribution upon the dynamic structure of legal
rights, but it almost totally neglects the absolute importance of
differing initial income and wealth positions. But the underlying or
initial distributions, 12 and the legal rights on which they rest at least in
part, do govern the specific allocation results generated by the rule,
e.g., by defining the bounds of the Pareto domain or the Edgeworth
6. See, inter alia, d'Arge & Schulze, The Coase Proposition, Wealth Effects, and Long Run
Equilibrium, 1, 7 Working Paper No. 19, Aug. 1972, Program in Environmental Economics,
University of California, Riverside; A. Randall, Welfare, Efficiency, and the Distribution of
Rights, in Perspectives of Property supra note 1, at 25, 28.
7. R. Turvey, On Divergences Between Social Cost and Private Cost, 33 Economica 309
(1963).
8. W. Samuels, Welfare Economics, Power, and Property, in Perspectives of Property, supra
note 1, at 127, 131, & passim.
9. Id., at 135-136.
10. Id., at 136-137.
11. Id. The argument which calls for the complete and clear specifications of rights-which
will be further considered below-is inadequate, at least inasmuch as different specifications of
rights and different assignments of rights produce different allocations of resources. This is one
of the central arguments of this paper.
12. What Musgrave calls primary redistribution; see R. A. Musgrave, Pareto Optimal
Redistribution: Comment, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 991 (1970).
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box. Moreover, rights are not neutral in that respect alone, but also in
regard to the differential impact of, say, liability rules upon allocation
given differing and unequal income, wealth and liquidity distributions
or positions. Change the initial distribution of entitlements, i.e.,
property and other rights, and the allocation of resources will be
changed. An individual's ability and willingness to pay or to receive
certain prices in externality internalizing transactions under the
Coase theorem tend to be a function of his wealth position.' 3 Quite
aside from considerations of equity in regard to distributional
consequences, those consequences and the corresponding allocative
results will be a partial function of the initial distribution, 14 or status
quo point as it has been sometimes called.
A subsidiary corollary, which the Coase theorem shares with Pareto
optimality reasoning generally, concerns the optimality of doing
nothing, i.e., the argument that the nonexistence of a transaction or
other adjustment may be the optimal solution if and when the parties
are already in optimal positions, as when the costs of an adjustment
outweigh the gains thereof. One problem with this, of course, is that it
directly reflects the fundamental tautology 15 of Pareto optimality
which makes both transactions and the absence of transactions,
whichever is the status quo, presumptively optimal. But the critical
point here is that the optimality of any transaction or of doing nothing
is always a partial function of the status quo power structure and the
cost-price structure to which it gives effect. Adjustments, transactions
and solutions are always at least partially specific to those structures.
A change in the cost-price structure, resulting from a change in the
power structure through a change in relative rights, would lead to
different adjustments, transactions and solutions being optimal or
within the Pareto-domain or Edgeworth box. A change in the power
structure might mean that doing nothing would no longer be optimal,
and vice versa. There is no unique relevant optimum.
The allocation contemplated by the Coase theorem is therefore a
partial function of antecedently determined rights, and the theorem
must be comprehended in a general equilibrium context in which
13. G. Calabresi & A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1095 (1972).
14. Distributional consequences of one period become the initial distribution of the next
with the allocative consequences discussed in the text. Liability rules have economic
significance in terms of the initial distributions of any period and impact on the distributional
consequences of that period and thereby on the initial distributions of the next period. Where
the rule affects the marginal utility of money, it affects resource allocation. Schmid, Nonmarket
Values and Efficiency of Public Investments in Water Resources, 57 Am. Econ. Rev., Papers &
Proc. 158, 164 (1967).
15. Samuels, supra note 1, at 75-77, & passim.
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rights are developed and changed and in which rights and changing
rights have allocational impact.
The Coase theorem, again not unlike Pareto optimality reasoning
generally, is usually advanced in a laissez faire context assuming and
emphasizing the propriety of allocations made through market
adjustments. In such use the theorem tends to reinforce status quo
rights and power structures, 16 to reinforce selected elements thereof
vis-a-vis other elements, 17 or to obscure the importance of antecedently determined rights in governing the substance of externality
solutions and resource allocation. 18 But an opposite use of the
theorem and of Pareto optimality can be made to argue in favor of
different rights structures and/or different income and wealth distributions. Admittedly this may be very difficult. There seems to be
something about the inner logic of Pareto optimality (and its
underlying premise of consumer sovereignty) that reinforces existing
rights by taking them for granted. Yet, if the central thrust of the
Coase theorem is allowed, namely, the neutrality of rights in regard to
allocation, then it would follow that a change in liability would not
adversely affect efficiency (all other things being equal-which this
paper shows to beg the critical variables involved, of course), and that
goals other than efficiency can be advanced through tort law without
interfering with allocative goals. 19
Insofar as the allocation is a function of the rights structure, the
interpretation of the Coase theorem that has neutrality connote
identical resource allocations is wrong. Yet the interpretation of the
Coase theorem that has neutrality signify only equally efficient but
different resource allocations says nothing that Pareto optimality does
not already say. Coase theorem allocations may or may not be
efficient in terms of the Paretian or any other optimality criterion, but
they are not independent of rights, for legal rights partially govern
market behavior from which emanate the market forces governing
resource allocation, thereby giving effect, inter alia, to the underlying
structure of legal rights.
16. K. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of
Market versus Nonmarket Allocation, in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures:
The PPB System, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 50, (1969); Samuels, supra
note 1, at 99ff; Samuels, In Defense of a Positive Approach to Government as an Economic
Variable, 15 J. Law & Econ. 453, 457-458 (1972).
17. Samuels, supra note 1, at 102 & passim.
18. Maximization of the value of production is a function of and gives effect to the status quo
power structure and the cost-price structure derived therefrom. See references cited note 16,
supra.
19. Peacock & Rowley, Pareto Optimality and the Political Economy of Liberalism, 80 J. Pol.
Econ. 476 (1972)
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THE COASIAN ANALYSIS AND THE NONNEUTRALITY OF
RIGHTS AND LIABILITY RULES
The Coase theorem asserts a relationship between rights and
resource allocation. Given a narrowly constrained character of the
relationship articulated, the questions arise as to (a) what are the full
range of relationships of rights to resource allocation, and conversely
up to a point, (b) what governs the allocation of resources. The Coase
theorem points to one connection between rights and allocation
when, as a matter of fact, there are several, including ones that are far
more important for both analytical and policy purposes than that
posed by the theorem. This subsection will explore the major relations
of rights to allocation, thereby giving a somewhat more complete
answer to the first question than is given by the theorem, and in so
doing answer the second question insofar as rights govern the
allocation of resources. In addition, the reciprocal character of
erternalities will be considered in light of the foregoing.
A. On the Economic Significance of Rights
1. The Importance of Antecedent Rights.
The most important relationship of rights to resource allocation is
given by the proposition that allocation is a function of rights; or,
more elaborately, that the allocation of resources, nominally or
proximately a function of market demand and supply forces, is less
proximately but no less importantly a function of the weighting of
preferences by income and wealth distribution. This weighting is
ultimately a partial function of the assignment and distribution of
legal rights. The relevant economic outcomes, namely, the substance
of optimality conditions and of resource allocation, are a partial
function of the structure of rights governing the structure of
opportunity sets from within which choices are made. The domain of
the Edgeworth box and of the Pareto-set are both governed by the
structure of legal rights, and the outcome of market activity is pro
tanto a partial function of, and specific to, the structure of legal rights.
Looking at the same point from a different facet, the establishment of
any efficient situation or solution requires an antecedent specification
of the rights (protected interests) in terms of which efficiency is
determined. 20 Efficiency is always a matter of market position, as well
as the more-or-less self-chosen results from within extant opportunity
sets, 21 and market position is in part a function of the structure of
20. Randall, supra note 6, at 28; cf. Samuels, supra note 1; Regan, The Problem of Social Cost
Revisited, 15 J. Law & Econ. 427, 429 n. 5 & passim.
21. The composition of a particular opportunity set is to be distinguished from the total
structure of opportunity sets. One general equilibrium dualism is indicated by the proposition
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legal rights. Indeed, rights produce optimal solutions because optimal
solutions are defined in terms of an equilibrium of choices based upon
extant rights. 2 2 Therefore, in a sense, they are also defined in terms of
an equilibrium of rights, but always in terms of antecedently specified
23
rights.
Such rights enable participation in the economic decision making
process. Without rights, participants or potential participants are not
able to act upon (for example, demand and/or supply) their preferences and capabilities. Without rights, their status as economic actors
is an empty set; which is to say, the content of opportunity sets, each
of which marks the decisional space at a point in time for the
participant involved, is a partial function of rights, and the overall
structure of opportunity sets is a partial function of rights. The
working rules of property and liability law, inter alia, and their
application through the legal process, determine the relative access to
and use of property by the various participants, as well as their
relative exposure to the participation of others. Different rights
assignments mean different structures of participation in economic
decision making.
Thus in their recent survey of the property rights literature,
Furubotn and Pejovich stress the importance of the structure of
property right assignments for socio-economic relations, the structure
of opportunity sets and the allocation of resources:
... different property rights assignments lead to different
penalty reward structures and, hence, decide the choices that are
open to decision makers. 24. . . "property rights" tend to influence incentives and behavior . . . A central point . . . is that

property rights do not refer to relations between men and things
that the opportunity set of an individual depends upon the total structure of power and
operation of mutual coercion and the total structure of power depends upon the decisions made
by individuals from within their opportunity sets at any point in time and over time (and
perforce the operation of mutual coercion). See Samuels, The PoliticalEconomy of Regulation:
Public Utilities and the Theory of Power, in an untitled volume 6 & passim (Milton Russell ed.,
to be published by Southern Illinois University Press). Thus choice from within opportunity sets
is to be distinguished from the factors and forces governing the aggregate structure of
opportunity sets and thereby the size and composition of individual opportunity sets.
22. J. Buchanan, Politics, Property,and the Law: An Alternative Interpretationof Miller et al
v. Schoene, 15 J. Law & Econ. 439, 452 (1972); cf. Samuels, supranote 16, at 457-458.
23. "Pigou goes on to say that if self-interest does promote economic welfare, it is because
human institutions have been devised to make it so." Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
Law & Econ. 1 (1960), at 29. The point, of course, is that whatever self-interest is maximized is a
function of and specific to the institutions that guide its realization, and the recommendatory
force of the self-interest results is in part dependent upon the propriety of the institutions which
produce those results. The role of antecedently specified rights is to give effect to the choices
embodied in the institution which are echoed in the allocative results through the rights.
24. Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent
Literature, 10 J. Econ. Literature 1138 (1972).

NA TURAL RESOURCES-JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

but, rather, to the sanctionedbehavioralrelations among men that
arisefrom the existence of things and pertain to their use. Property

rights assignments specify the norms of behavior with respect to
things that each and every person must observe in his interactions
with other persons, or bear the cost for nonobservance. The
prevailing system of property rights in the community can be
described, then, as the set of economic and social relations
defining the position of each
individual with respect to the
25
utilization of scarce resources
Rights, it should be clear from this, are not neutral with regard to
resource allocation. It is on the basis of rights that economic actors
are able to influence the allocation of resources, i.e., rights govern the
identity and positions of participants with respect to the utilization of
scarce resources. Where a person has a right which others must
respect, the others are perforce less well situated, and the right holder
more well situated, with regard to influencing allocation. 26 Thus
Furubotn and Pejovich continue as follows:
The value of any good exchanged depends, ceteris paribus, on
the bundle of property rights that is conveyed in the transaction.
.. . Consequently, a change in the general system of property
relations must affect the way people behave and, through this
effect on behavior, property right assignments affect the allocation of resources, composition of output, distribution of income,
etc.

27

The Coase theorem, which the authors also survey, operates only
within this general framework, i.e., it is juxtaposed to and limited by
this more general principle, although the relative position of the two
28
are not specified by them.
With respect to this fundamental and ubiquitous impact of rights
on allocation, the Coase theorem actually establishes a tautological
position by saying that allocation is independent of rights with the
assumption that there is no effect of differential liquidity and wealth
distribution. Thus, Furubotn and Pejovich echo Demsetz 29 and others
by having the theorem stipulate that "the composition of output in the
economy is independent of the structure of property rights, except
insofar as changes in the distribution of wealth affect demand
patterns." 30 But wealth distribution is itself a partial function of legal
rights; thus the theorem really says that allocation is independent of
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1139.
Randall, supra note 6, at 30.
Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1139.
Id. at 1143.
H. Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? I J. Legislative Studies 15 n. 3.
Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1143.
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rights except insofar as wealth distribution is a function of rights.
Insofar as allocation is a function of wealth distribution, however,
allocation is a function of rights. 3 1 It will be noticed further that (a)
the assumption which rules out income and wealth distribution
consequences makes the Pareto rule meaningless, since distributional
effects are major factors with regard to increases and reductions in
opportunity sets; (b) if one objectively analyzes the full range of
consequences of rights and liability rules, without attempting a chain
of reasoning by which to support the market, one would recognize
that distributional effects are important, e.g., as the basis of the initial
rights and opportunity set structure of the next period; (c) the
Coasian-Paretian analysis, once again, neglects both the real world of
power play over rights and liability imposition and the use of
government in regard thereto (changes in rights due to power play
with distributional consequences as the intended-desired goal, producing changes in allocation); and (d) liability rules can be used to
effectuate redistribution as such.
Just as there is no unique Pareto optimum there is no unique
structure of rights. Given the structure of rights there will be or tend
to be an optimal solution specific thereto. Change the structure of
rights and there will be or tend to be a changed solution. Calabresi
and Melamed, however, have recently written that
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements
which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not
be improved in the sense that a further change would not so
improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could
compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than
32
before. This is often called Pareto optimality.
They go on to discuss the minimization of costs and the maximization
of the value of output, the "highest product for the effort of
producing." 33 But there is no such unique allocation of resources,
because there is no such unique set of entitlements (rights assignments). Any operative conclusion as to the Pareto optimality of any
such situation presumes a priori the optimality of the set of
entitlements either extant or imagined (or projected). Rights specify
efficiency, efficiency does not specify rights. There are many sets of
entitlements which would lead to Pareto optimal allocations. As
Schmid has put it, property rights must be "first established to say
31. This is not unlike saying that the argument of the Coase theorem assumes the truth of
the theorem. Regan, supra note 20, at 435. Or that the theorem is true only to the extent that it
is true, which is not saying much.
32. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1094.
33. Id. at 1094.
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who counts. Depending on the property rights, there are all kinds of
Pareto-better trades possible, which would produce a whole range of
price sets . . . and other performance results," 34 including resource
allocation and output composition. Allocation will always be a
function of rights even where certain facets of the market follow the
Coase theorem, so that allocation is also influenced by "the fact that a
cost is incurred by B when he pays an indemnity to A in order to
produce another unit of output, or when B foregoes a bribe by A
35
designed to induce B to limit production."
Moreover, not only are the rights which count the antecedently
determined rights (both where status quo rights are taken for granted
and where the rights contemplated are the preferred rights in the
mind of the analyst or policy maker), but there are sound, traditional,
even conservative reasons for making a person's entitlement not
dependent or contingent on his having to pay others to refrain from
depriving him thereof. This point has been well put by Tribe in a
discussion of the Coasian analysis:
• . .the reasons for recognizing in person X an entitlement to B
would in all likelihood be incompatible with making X's enjoyment of B contingent upon his having to pay others to refrain
from depriving him of B, even if X were given enough resources to
make such bribes. For X's sense of self and of autonomy may be
intimately bound up not just with the bare fact of having
B . ..but with the shared social and legal understandingthat B
belongs to X ab initio, as a matter of right. And to the extent that
this is so, the Coasian analysis would fail even if it were ultimately
to assign B to X on grounds of efficiency, for being "assigned" B on
such grounds cannot satisfy the particular need met
by a
36
recognized right to B in the special sense developed here.
This reasoning is very powerful, although it too must be qualified by
the aforementioned reasoning to the effect that rights (property)
cannot properly be assigned on the grounds of efficiency 3 7 without
presuming whose interests should count (i.e., making interpersonal
34. Schmid, supra note 14, at 164.
35. Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1143.
36. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology? 2 Philosophy & Public Affairs 66, 88-89
(1972). The relevant section of Tribe's article should be read in its entirety. This line of
reasoning carries with it the very important implication that stated prejudices for established
rights (See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 22, at 452) are impossible of rea'y *tion and, in particular,
are selectively applied. In regard to the ambiguity of Pareto optimality (and, by extension, the
Coase theorem) on this point, see Samuels, supra note 1, at 78-103. On the theory that rights
cannot exist without this dependent or contingent element (pretenses to the contrary), see
Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert
Lee Hale, U. Miami L. Rev. forthcoming (mimeographed, 1970).
37. Tribe, supra note 36, at 86, 87, 88, 89.
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utility judgments and valuations); since, again, efficiency is a function
of rights and not vice versa. Tribe does say that "the very concept of a
right entails certain assumptions as to the reasons given for its
recognition,- 38 but Paretian efficiency cannot be the reason without
circular reasoning (following upon the analyst's choice of interests to
be protected and counted). And, of course, the introduction of a right
(i.e., to facilitate market solutions) is itself non-Pareto optimal in
regard to those whose rights are inhibited by the new right. Rights are
relative to other rights as well as to the law, and the introduction of a
new right ipso facto means the lessening of another right(s).
This brings me to the ambivalent and highly selective treatment
given by the Coasian analysis to rights. If rights are relative and
contingent, then why are rights changes in accordance with the
Coasian rules less objectionable than in accordance, say, with the
goals of egalitarian radicals? One is no more immediately paternalistic than the other. The Coasian answer 3 9 is that its analysis is
necessary in order to have the market operate. In this case, the
Coasian analysis is but an attempt to lend the credo of science to
normative justification of the market and its fantasies of markets
everywhere, and to have everything seen in that light. The Coase
theorem, whatever its tenuous relations to science and to reality, is
ideology at one of its most esoteric levels.
One example of the combination of the points made in the three
paragraphs immediately preceding is the tendency to evaluate the
prospective assignment of a right on the basis of cost-benefit
considerations. 40 This evaluation assumes the status quo cost-price
structure emanating from the status quo rights structure in order to
evaluate a legal change, when the legal change in question has to do
with the very rights governing the costs that are to be realized in the
market. The status quo rights structure gives effect to only one answer
to the question of whose interests should count as costs to others; and
cost-benefit analysis, by using the costs based on the status quo rights,
can only tend to give further effect to those rights, when prospective
legal change involves the very propriety of existing rights. Either the
existing rights will be affirmed and reinforced or they will be changed
through the analyst's introduction of some additional normative
element (deliberately or not). The issue in evaluting rights is not how
or whether rights measure up to costs but the old versus the new
rights, and the different cost structures to which they contribute.
38.
39.
40.
Econ.

Id. at 101 n. 99.
Buchanan, supra note 22, at 452.
McKean, Products Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property Rights, 84
613, 621 (1970); see Samuels, supra note 16, at 454.

Q. J.
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There can be Pareto optimality both before and after a change in
rights. But using cost-benefit calculations tends to bias the analysis
toward existing rights or rights given an equivalent status. The same is
true for certain aspects of constitutional law. 41 Throughout all these
considerations is the overriding principle that the allocation of
resources is a function of the identification, assignment and distribution of rights (wealth). Allocation is not independent of rights. (On
costs as a function of rights, see the second subsection below.)
2. Rights, Rights Equivalents and the Rights FormationProcess.
It is clearly beyond the possibilities of this paper to attempt a
comprehensive model of rights or of the development or dynamics of
rights, but there are several matters which bear on a meaningful
assessment of the Coase theorem. First, with regard to the semantics
of policy, the distinction between rights as claims, as legally
recognized claims, and as legally protected claims has to be kept in
41. Mishan thus comments that
For any Pareto improvement under the L law is one which must begin from the
distribution of welfare as determined by reference to the existing amounts of
spillover in the economy. . . . Even if negotiation costs fall over time . . . the

mere fact of the spillovers having grown over time will make any worthwhile
Pareto improvement less likely. For the effect of maintaining L law for some time
is to permit the growth of spillover-creating industries, and perhaps to allow some
industries to flourish which would not have come into being at all under an L law.
Eventually, the numbers using the products of such industries, the numbers
employed in them, the wealth of the owners, and the power and influence of the
managers, combine to create a formidable interest that is as difficult to oppose on
economic principles as it is difficult to dislodge by political means. E. Mishan,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, (Praeger, 1971), at 358-359.
The late Robert L. Hale wrote that the law formally gives protection to the property of some
persons against the coercive acts of others.
Against such coercion, since it is not recognized as stemming from government,
the Constitution by itself affords no protection. But this coercive power of the
others is part of the liberty and property which the Constitution does protect
against governmental action, and the legislation which curtails it is undeniably
governmental action. Therefore, while those who are deprived of liberty or
property by the coercive power of other private persons can make no appeal at all
to the Constitution for protection, those who deprive them of their liberty or
property can involve it, in the very name of liberty and property, to preserve their
power to deprive others of these same things. R. Hale, Freedom through Law, 132
(1952).
This is a good statement of the superior position of established rights, e.g., of property, and of
why private interests seek government protection-all of which is obscured by the Coase
theorem. It is not enough to say that such relations are reciprocal (as does the Coasian analysis),
for the distribution of property is unequal or asymmetrical and, moreover, the specific issues in
contention do not arise symmetrically, i.e., the different parties are not equally endangered:
Alpha's constitutional protection to exercise coercion against others may not be at issue but
legal control of Beta's may be, the policy question always being the structure of mutual
coercion. On rights and other equivalents, e.g., regulation, see the next subsection in the text.
Hale has an extensive analysis of inequality as a function of law (which is also obscured by the
Coasian analysis); see Samuels, supra note 36, at 94ff.
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mind. This has to do primarily with the dynamics of the rights
formation process, which will be touched upon below. At this point, it
should be clear that rights are relative both to legal limitations (not all
of which are marketable, by any means) and to changing market
forces (the value of a right is a function of discounted market income,
and the value and therefore the right is exposed to the play of market
forces). Thus even though legal protection has very limited economic
significance, 4 2 it obviously is better to have one's interests protected
as rights than not to. This is something which the Coase theorem
tends to confuse: if rights do not count, then why do people want
them? Rights have to be comprehended in a dynamic general
equilibrium system of power, opportunity sets, choice from within
opportunity sets and mutual coercion.
Second, the theorem is unsatisfactory in regard to the entire matrix
of legal bases of participation in the economic process. Many bases
other than nuisance liability rules and generalized property rights are
neglected by the theorem or by the analysts. There are many
common, statutory, administrative and constitutional law bases of
rights other than nuisance liability and property laws, such as the law
of contracts and of business organization, caveat emptor, replevin,
strict liability to the consumer, adhesion contracts, remedies, privity
(standing) and burden of proof.4 3 In a general equilibrium system of
rights and opportunity sets, all rights of economic significance have to
be included. The theorem is incomplete in regard to the totality of
legal factors of economic significance that govern exposure to the
power of others. Change of these legal factors will affect the structure
of externalities, the structure of externality solutions through the
market, and the allocation of resources, as well as the distribution of
income and wealth.
Third, one of the major errors of the Coasian analysis, one which is
directly reflective of the laissez faire, noninterventionist tenor of the
usual Coasian discussion, is that it neglects the fact that government
regulation is the functional equivalent of property rights. Perhaps the
42. Thus, for example, increasing the cost of something in the market through creation of a
right protecting an interest (see below) may price the product out of the market or involve
fewer sales because of demand elasticity and therefore less protection or realization of the
interest than without the creation of the right, ceteris paribus other rights enabling and
structuring participation in the market. Economic significance is partially a matter of the law
and partially a matter of market conditions, but always a matter of how individuals (not
presumptively reasoning analysts) define their own interests. This is also a good example of what
I elsewhere call a general equilibrium dualism, namely, that market forces are a function of
rights and that rights or the value of rights is a function of market forces. Samuels, supra note
21.
43. See Samuels, supra note 1, at 139-140 & passim; and Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
13, at 1122 n. 62 & passim.
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word "neglects" should be replaced by "rejects," because, as has been
seen above, the Coasian analyst is concerned lest government
regulation impinge upon efficient solutions defined in terms of existing
(or hypothesized) rights. Here the Coasian analyst is allowing a
normative preference to obscure a positive fact, for regulation is
functionally equivalent to rights in governing the terms of access to
and use of what one comes to call one's property. Participation in the
economy is a function both of what are identified as property rights
and of other phenomena such as regulation. Indeed, the distinction
ultimately breaks down inasmuch as what is thought of as rights are
themselves a partial function of past regulatory actions of government. Thus when a pollution control board sets standards, it is, rightly
or wrongly, providing the functional equivalent to establishing rights
insofar as the creation, identification and assignment of market
opportunities is concerned. On the one hand, there is more to the
world of power than what comes to be called "rights"; on the other,
setting standards is one way of giving legal effect to someone's
property-right claims. A property-right equivalent has been created,
when it has become important or valuable to do so (and which could
not have been readily anticipated, as required by the Coasian notion
of fully and clearly defined rights. Regulation, as a property-right
equivalent, is one way of resolving that problem, though conservatives
fail to see it.) The neglect of this role of regulation is but one example
of presumptive optimality reasoning. To say that someone may
"over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation," 44 or that government regulation may go "too far," 4 5 is to
recognize only rights per se (vis-a-vis regulation); and to presume the
propriety of existing rights is thereby to presume in favor of the
existing law of property as opposed to a prospective change in the
law.

46

Fourth, what this means is that the Coasian analysis (and that
libertarianism which defines freedom in terms of no change through
law) 47 neglects 48 the fact that there is no once-and-for-all-time rights
creation, 49 but rather a continuing process of legal rights evolution.
The process of determining legal rights is joint and/or contemporaneous with all other activity. The legal framework of the market is
44.
45.
46.
(1971).
47.
48.
49.

Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 18 (1960).
Id. at 28.
Samuels, Interrelations between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J. Law & Econ. 435
See inter alia, B. Leoni, Freedom and the Law, (1961).
Or only shows its normative and nondescriptive character.
Compare Buchanan, supra note 22, at 452, with Samuels, supra note 16, at 456 & passim.
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dynamic and not static, 50 whether one likes it that way nor not. 51
What is commonly called intervention (since government is present
ab initio, i.e., in already existing rights) is only a change in the
interests to which government will lend its support. 52 It is only one
episode in the historic process, neglected by the Coasians, 53 wherein
relative rights are worked out. Rights are like prices. They are
episodic resting places in the play of market and other forces,
including the legal process. This may not be congenial, but that is the
way it is, normative fantasizing notwithstanding. Those, then, who
argue that regulation (e.g., setting pollution standards-for which this
should not be read as a brief) distorts the free market, are only giving
effect to the antecedently (pre-regulation) specified rights, when the
central policy issue is precisely that rights pattern (and the accompanying cost structure) versus the new rights pattern (and its accom54
panying cost structure).
In light of the earlier discussion, the Coasian analyst is not
consistent in this matter. The Coasian analyst both extols existing
rights and injects his own contemplated rights changes, though not
always recognizing either the fact or the consequences thereof for
other rights. The juxtaposition of creating property rights, so extolled
by them, and regulation, so denigrated by them, is improper
analytically; though much of the analysis is intended to operate on
that basis and to function to abort environmental-protection regulation other than through the creation of property rights and markets
for externalities. Whatever one thinks of the correct or desired
strategy(ies) for environmental protection, the distinction between
rights and regulation is false. Rights are changed through creating
new rights, explicitly identified as such, and through regulation. One
may be perceived as more congenial than the other, but they are
functionally equivalent for present purposes. To hold otherwise is
analytically improper, although it has its role in legitimizing the
market (with the performance of the role having its own distinctive
paternalistic character).
One of the conclusions to which the foregoing leads is that,
whatever one thinks of government or of the particular things that
particular governments do, government is not superfluous and redun50. Samuels, The Classical Theory of Economic Policy, 126-160 (1966).
51. Samuels, supra note 16, at 458.
52. Samuels, supra note 46, at 441-442 & passim.
53. Samuels, supra note 16, at 456 & passim.
54. On the general equilibrium openendedness of coupling ecological and socio-economic
factors, see Samuels, Ecosystem Policy and the Problem of Power, 2 Environmental Affairs 580
(1973).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

dant. The very process of rights determination (as clear as rights can
be or are) is a continuing and broad phenomenon, though the
Coasians would have us believe, or pretend, otherwise. Government is
not irrelevant to resource allocation, nor are rights; and a positive
approach to the roles of government and of rights, including
regulation, in regard to resource allocation 55 would, inter alia, show
the limited positive and limited and ambiguous normative significance of the Coasian analysis, however much one tended to concur
with their general normative position. 56 In these matters, the Coase
theorem is, again, more a doctrine than a scientific theorem.
3. Costs and Rights.
A further principle which is both more fundamental and more
universal than the Coase theorem, but which is ignored and obscured
by the Coasian analysis, is that costs are a partial function of rights. 57
The Coase theorem takes costs as given, but costs themselves are a
function of rights; that is to say, rights help govern whose interests are
made a cost to others. The costs actually registered in the market are
from a wide range of possibilities. The cost-price structure is a
function of and specific to the opportunity-set structure between
individuals and to the choices made from within opportunity sets by
individuals. The opportunity set structure is a function of the power
structure and mutual coercion, so that the costs registered through the
market are a partial function of the rules and rights governing the
access to and use of power (property). Costs are ultimately a partial
function of legal arrangements. 58 As Tideman has put it, "Social
decisions about property rights can be analyzed as decisions as to
which costs will be compensated and which ones will not . . . the
most controversial questions of public policy can be stated usefully as
questions of what losses should go uncompensated. '' 59 Costs are
partially a function of and specific to the power and rights structures. 60 Therefore, inferences made with respect to rights or to
55. Samuels, supra note 1, and supra note 16.
56. Samuels, supra note 16, at 459.
57. This principle is analyzed and its implications explored in W. Samuels & A. Schmid,
Costs and Power (mimeographed, 1972).
58. McKean, supra note 40, at 617; Pearce & Sturmey, Privateand Social Costs and Benefits:
A Note on Terminology, 76 Econ. J. 152, 153, 156, 157.
59. T. Tideman, Property as A Moral Concept, in Perspectives of Property supra note 1, at
202, 203. Cf. Mishan, A Reply to Professor Worcester, 10 J. Econ. Literature 61 (1972). These
include Mishan's amenity rights (E. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth (1967)) and
Calabresi and Melamed's moral costs (supranote 13, at 1102, 1112ff).
60. Coase quotes one case as follows: "Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a
very pretty village." Coase, supra note 23, at 20. Such a statement reverberates with problems
of power structure and of whose costs count, as in industrialization versus nonindustrialization.
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policies affecting rights, which are based on market costs, give effect
to the rights on which the costs are themselves based. Similarly,
maximization of the value of production is always in terms of the
costs, which are given effect in part through legal rights governing
whose interests are to count as costs to others. To evaluate costs and
benefits in terms of the maximized value of production is to reason
circularly to give effect to already extant costs and the rights reflected
61
or given effect therein.
The costs used by the Coase theorem, e.g., with regard to the
marginal equivalences, are costs that are themselves a partial function
of rights. 62 Yet the theorem would have it that allocation is
independent of rights. For the Coase theorem, despite its silence
and/or negativism, the existing structure of rights, through costs,
antecedently influences the social decision as to which harms are the
most serious and the economic desirability and feasibility of various
alternatives, 63 and ultimately the allocation of resources, even with
zero transaction costs.
The initial article by Coase (echoed in the literature in this regard)
considered rights as factors of production. Yet, curiously, the effective
thrust of the theorem is that rights are not factors of production, since
allocation is independent of rights. And, of course, the subsequent
elaboration and defense of the theorem has tended to take rights as
given. Thus Demsetz, in explicating and defending the Coase
theorem, has written that
The rule of liability that is chosen can have no effect on his
decisions because the owner of such a firm must bear the
interaction cost whichever legal rule is adopted. The cost
interdependence
is a technical-economic interdependence, not a
64
legal one.
This is not true, either practically or theoretically. Demsetz himself,
in an earlier article on property rights, recognized that costs are a
partial function of rights, inasmuch as the law helps determine which
costs, out of a range of possibilities, become operative as rights:
It is clear, then, that property rights specify how persons may be
benefited and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to
modify the actions taken by persons. The recognition of this leads
The answer, positively or normatively, is not simple; but the costs that are effectuated in the
market are a partial function of the law.
61. See Coase, supra note 23, at 15-16, 40.
62. Costs, as a function of rights, govern the structure of cost curves, the so-called
Pareto-relevant and irrelevant regions, and inter aia the results of bargaining.
63. Coase, supra note 23, at 2.
64. Demsetz, supra note 29, at 19.
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easily to the65 close relationship between property rights and
externalities.
Rights are a factor of production-he who is without rights will not
have his interests count as a cost to others, ceteris paribus.Externalities are a function of the structure of rights. Externalities involve costs
shifted to others through rights and liability rules. This is utterly
neglected by the (conservative) use of the Coase theorem, which takes
rights and the costs derived therefrom for granted. The theorem's
laissez faire animus, or the partial equilibrium character, is contrary
to the profound implications of asking whose interests count or ought
to count as a cost to others.
Legal liability rules, it is admitted by all (see below), govern
transactions costs which inhibit exchange. The same is the case, as a
general principle with all costs. All costs are partially a function of
the existence, non-existence and structure of rights; and all costs, not
just transaction costs, inhibit or channel exchange. With respect to
legal liability rules, such rules can bring an interest into consideration
(say, in negotiation), which the parties would not necessarily have
hitherto or otherwise counted as a cost, given prior problems of
organizability, etc. The liability rule helps govern which interests will
actually count as costs. The same is true of all legal rights. Coase's
assumption that all costs are considered by the firm, including the
implicit or opportunity costs, as discussed above, is unrealistic. Actual
market costs depend in part on whose interests are made a cost to
others, through rights. Here again it is better to have one's interests
protected in rights than not to have them. It is better to have rights
than not to have them. Rights do count.
Costs as a function of rights is a rival though complementary
principle of greater generality than (and is antecedent to and
therefore limiting upon) both Pareto-optimality and the Coase
theorem. The principle of costs as a function of rights effectively
reverses the thrust of the Coase theorem with regard to the
importance of the legal system and rights to allocation. The allocation
of resources is a partial function of the identification and assignment
of property and other rights, in part through the latter's impact upon
the cost-price structure. This principle and the Coase theorem both
have to be comprehended as parts of a general equilibrium system, in
which it is true that the value of rights is a partial function of costs
and costs are a partial function of rights. 66 Allocation cannot be
65. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev., Papers & Proc. 247
(1967).
66. Also: costs are a function of the power structure and the power structure is a function of
costs, and the structure of costs is a function of the opportunity set structure (and choice from
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independent of rights, when, inter alia, the cost functions (and
demand functions, for that matter) which enter into the determination of allocation are themselves a partial function of rights.
B. On TransactionsCosts and Other Allocative Considerations
The Coase theorem assumes zero transactions costs in order to
make its assertion about the independence of allocation from rights.
But if the statement of a theorem should have any substantive affinity
with the real world, the appropriate theorem would be that allocation
is a partial function of differential liability placement and the
differential transaction cost system erected by each.
By the zero transaction cost assumption the Coasian analysis does,
of course, recognize that transaction costs-by which are meant the
costs of organization, negotiation and administration and enforcement
of contracts and other private and/or public arrangements-are a
major limitation to internalization and ipso facto (though not solely) a
cause of the divergence between social and private costs and
benefits. 67 But the handling of transaction costs by the Coasian
analysis distorts the real world importance thereof: transactions costs
in fact dominate real world cases. Zero transaction costs are the
unusual, indeed the exceptional, case. The choice of transaction cost
systems (i.e., liability rules) govern the allocative consequences.
Furubotn and Pejovich remark that the zero transactions cost
assumption is a "simplification . . . recognized as unrealistic," 68
but one would not recognize this from much of the standard literature
extolling the Coase theorem. The qualification is often given, but the
analysis proceeds as if the qualification was minor and trivial. Much
more meaningful, though less doctrinally congenial, would be the
proposition that allocation is a function of transaction costs which are
a partial function of the law.
Moreover, transactions costs are treated by the Coasian analysis as
an aberration, as an unfortunate impediment to negotiation and
internalization, as if in a perfect world such friction would be absent.
Yet transactions costs do represent relevant interests, or at least
interests no less relevant than the typical non-transaction costs.
Transaction costs represent the protection of interests through rights
as they become valued through the market, which is the case with all
other costs. Nor is there any reason to single out transaction costs for
the treatment given them by the Coase theorem: all costs inhibit
within opportunity sets) and the opportunity set structure is a function of the structure of costs.
Samuels & Schmid, supra note 57, at 8.
67. Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1143-1144.
68. Id. at 1143. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1096: "But no one makes an
assumption of no transaction costs in practice."
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exchange and transactions. Pareto optimal and internalizing solutions
are always a partial function of costs, and costs are always a partial
function of legal rights, including the so-called transaction costs.
The general principle should be that transaction costs are a partial
function of the transaction system, which in turn is a partial function
of the legal liability rule. 69 Thus Crocker found that changes in the
effective liability rule can have pronounced effects on internalization
per se, on resource allocation, and on the magnitude of the critical
externality (pollution emissions). The new liability rule brought about
internalization that had not been effectuated before, and with it
changes in values and allocation. The change in liability rule gave
rights status to certain interests which now had to be brought and
made into a cost to others. The new liability rule produced a new
transactions system with allocative consequences.70
The liability rule has allocative consequences in part because the
rule governs the status quo point and the transactions costs generated
by the rule govern the ability of the bargainers to move from the
status quo point.71 Liability rules govern the distribution of burden
between the so-called Pareto-relevant and Pareto-irrevelant externalities, no unimportant phenomenon;72 and they govern the adjustment
transactions and their allocative results.7 3 Change of the liability rule
opens up new areas for the Pareto-domain, new avenues for transac74
tions and consequent alterations in the allocation of resources.
Changes in liability rules will produce shifts in the cost curves,
something which the Coasian analysis escapes by presuming that the
cost curves will always include all implicit or opportunity costs. But
the real world phenomenon is that costs (including but not solely
transaction costs) will get registered in the market and in the cost
curve depending upon the liability rule in operation. The legal system
5
delimits the bargaining system, and the liability law does matter.
69. See Randall, On the Theory of Market Solutions to Externality Problems, supra note 3, at
41, 42; Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1146; Mishan, supra note 59, at 63ff; and
McKean, supra note 40, at 618, 626.
70. Crocker, Externalities,Property Rights, and TransactionsCosts: An EmpiricalStudy, 14 J.
Law & Econ. 451 (1971); Randall, Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice,
Am. J. Agricultural Econ. 179-180 (1972); and, for other references, and discussion, Furubotn &
Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1144.
71. See the works of Mishan and Randall cited above.
72. J. Weld, The Social Cost of the Coase Theorem, 11-13, 22 & passim, presented at the
Symposium on Environmental Economics and the Law, University of California, Riverside,
February 24-25, 1972.
73. Id. at 28-29; Mishan, The PostwarLiterature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J.
Econ. Literature 20 (1971).
74. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 Oxford Econ. Papers (1967); Mishan, supra
note 73; Mishan, A Reply to Professor Worcester, supra note 59, at 59.
75. Mumey, The "Coase Theorem": A Reexamination, 85 Q.J. Econ. 718, 722-723 (1971).
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Transactions costs based upon liability rules govern, then, the
distribution of the burdens of negotiation. In a world of asymmetrically distributed transaction costs,7 6 the locus of liability is important
with regard to distributional consequences (in addition to (a) the
aforementioned impact of the allocative impact of initial distribution,
(b) the likelihood of negotiation, (c) the realization of the internalization objective and (d) the allocation of resources). In a world of
asymmetrical transaction costs and of standardized contracts (contracts of adhesion), the nature of the liability rule will have profound
impact on the direction in which the bargains are made. Indeed, as
Arrow has pointed out, "It is not the presence of bargainingcosts per
se but their bias that is relevant. "7
Thus, the law is an instrument with which to skew distributional
results by manipulating transactional systems to change the structure
of power. As Demsetz has clearly pointed out, "The public policy
question is which groups of market participants, if any, are to receive
governmentally sponsored advantages and disadvantages, not only in
the subsidization or taxation of production, but also, in the creation of
advantages or disadvantages in conducting negotiations."'7 8 Such
advantages and disadvantages are not abberational. They are an
inevitable result of particular liability rules and particular transaction
systems. Indeed, Madelyn Kafoglis' view of externalities as "discrepancies between alternative legal and social arrangements" 7 9 is very
appropriate here. What is involved is whose interests are to be made
to count as costs to others, pro tanto through different liability rules.
Complex decisions are necessary in the choice of liability rules, 8 0 but
it is always a matter of which (whose) interest the government should
support or will be used to support; the former stating the point
normatively and the latter positively. Thus, as Regan puts it,
. . . once we realize that the legal rule affects (or, if we rely on
bargaining, presumably effects) the allocation of resources and the
distribution of welfare even granting Coase's assumption, we will
not be tempted to speak as if the only function, or even the
primary function, of legal rules when there are transaction costs is
to help us approach some unique optimum which would exist if
only transactions were costless. If there are externalities, then
there are decisions to be made about the distribution of welfare
76. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1120-1121 & passim; and references given in
Samuels, supra note 1, at 137 n. 210.
77. Arrow, supra note 16, at 51. "...
the critical impact of information on the optimal
allocation of risk bearing is not merely its presence or absence but its inequality among
economic agents." Id. at 55.
78. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?,11 J. Law & Econ. 55, 61 (1968).
79. Kafoglis, MarriageCustoms and Opportunity Costs, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 421,423 (1970).
80. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1122 &passim.
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even if we assume an "initial distribution of wealth" which is
specified in 81every other respect than the rules concerning
externalities.
The principle that transaction costs are a function of liability rule
(with allocative consequences) is analytically and empirically more
important than the Coase theorem. This has been demonstrated with
regard to pollution levels which are a matter of wide concern. Much
of the contemporary situation of water and air pollution is the result
of the fact that the past liability rule, which has been effectively one
of zero liability for pollutors despite the letter of certain (unenforced)
statutes, has produced negligible change and especially negligible
market change. The policy significance of the Coase theorem must be
seen in this perspective (and must not be diluted by the presumptive
reasoning of the optimality-of-doing-nothing argument).
A serious matter of inconsistency and further unrealism is contained
within the Coasian analysis. As d'Arge and Schulze have pointed out,
the Coasian analysis contemplates the non-pareto optimal introduction of an externality into an otherwise perfect system," and then
asserting that regardless of legal rules, the system will regain its
perfection." 8 2 But this conflicts with the assumption of zero transaction (including information) costs: ". . . these perturbations would
not occur in a competitive system with zero transactions . . . costs.
They would be known and bargained for prior to their occurrence
irrespective of the liability rule selected." 83 This another example
of how the Coasian analysis would eliminate the very problem
84
causing concern.
There is the argument that
where a market for an external diseconomy does not exist it should
not exist, since the benefits from such a market clearly cannot
absence of an observable
exceed the costs of its operation. The
85
market is, in itself, a market solution.
81. Regan, supra note 20, at 437.
Imposition of liability for damages is not just something to be decided on the sole
basis of ethical considerations about the distribution of income. Rather, it is a
crucial variable for economic and social policy with regard to externality.
Randall, On the Theory of Market Solutions to Externality Problems, supra note 3, at 45.
82. d'Arge & Schulze, The Coase Proposition, Wealth Effects, and Long Run Equilibrium, 2
Working Paper No. 19, Program in Environmental Economics, University of California,
Riverside (1967).
83. Id. at 3.
84. Per contra, McKean argues that zero transactions costs does not mean zero informational
costs and no uncertainty. McKean, supra note 40, at 618. The world of perfection is hard to
adequately specify; it may be specified to the analyst's selective delight.
85. The argument is generally associated with Demsetz. The quotation is from Randall,
Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice, supra note 3, at 176-177 n. 3.
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This position is, of course, a beautiful example of the presumptiveness
of most optimality reasoning. Whatever is, is, and moreover should be,
or else it would be different. It is the optimality of doing nothing. But
such optimality is a function of the transactions system and costs
produced by the extant liability rule. As Randall observes,
• . . the fallacy is obvious. The unprofitability of market solutions
does not prove that solution by any other method must also be
86
unprofitable.
-including a change in liability rule enabling a different market
solution. Once again, solutions are functions of and specific to the
power (rights) structures which give effect to them, including the
cost-price structure which serves as an intermediary mechanism. It is
by taking costs as given-when as a matter of fact they are a variable
function of rights, including liability rules governing which costs are
forced upon which economic actors-that the Coasian analysis is able
to yield its narrow conclusion about the independence of rights and
allocation. This compounds the error made by assuming that all
opportunity costs are considered in firm decision making.
Our final consideration of transaction costs has to do with the
arguments (a) that transaction costs should be minimized (so as to
maximize the value of production through internalization requiring
transactions); (b) that in choosing between alternative transaction cost
systems (i.e., alternative liability rules), that one with the lowest costs
should be selected; and (c) that the placement of liability should be on
the party most able to avoid costly solutions. Thus Demsetz argues
that
If courts are to ignore wealth, religion, or family in deciding such
conflicts, if persons before the courts are to be treated with regard
only to the cause of action and available proof, then, as a
normative proposition, it is difficult to suggest any criterion for
deciding liability other than placing it on the party able to avoid
the costly interaction most easily.87
Calabresi and Melamed would include among the criteria for
handling the transaction cost problem:
(1) that economic efficiency standing alone would dictate
that set of entitlements which favors knowledgeable choices
between social benefits and the social costs of obtaining them, and
between social costs and the social costs of avoiding them; (2) that
this implies, in the absence of certainty as to whether a benefit is
86. Id. at 177 n. 3.
87. Demsetz, supra note 29, at 28.
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worth its costs to society, that the cost should be put on the party
or activity best located to make such a cost/benefit analysis; (3)
that in particular contexts like accidents or pollution this suggests
putting costs on the party or activity which can most cheaply
avoid them; (4) that in the absence of certainty as to who that

party or activity is, the costs should be put on the party or activity
which can with the lowest transaction costs act in the market to
correct an error in entitlements by inducing the party who can

avoid social costs most cheaply to do so; and (5) that since we are
in an area where by hypothesis markets do not work perfectly
-there are transaction costs-a decision will often have to be
made on whether market transactions or collective fiat is most
likely to bring us close
to the Pareto optimal result the "perfect"
88
market would reach.

The principle and driving force of cost minimization is hardly to be
questioned, but cost minimization is always within some structure of
rights giving effect to costs (really to some costs and not to others), so
that the problem must be faced directly as to whose interests are not
to be given effect in the process of cost minimization and, further,
who is to determine this. There are several very important points to
be made here. First, although Demsetz writes of the courts ignoring
wealth, even where the courts ignore wealth explicitly, they cannot
ignore it implicitly, given the importance and impact of initial or
extant wealth distributions discussed above. Indeed, to ignore wealth
explicitly is to give effect to and reinforce the status quo wealth
distribution. Second, Calabresi and Melamed write of "knowledgeable choices" and the "party or activity best located to make
.. . cost/benefit analysis;" but that is to beg the all-important
question of the role of the existing distribution of rights and power.
Thus, they write of bringing us "close to the Pareto optimal result
which the 'perfect' market would reach," where there is no unique
Pareto optimal result, only results specific to the power structure; and
when the very act of legislating (through statute or court decision)
liability rules (through the joint rights determination process discussed
above) will also govern the rights and power structure and thereby the
Pareto optimal result, including the social determination of those best
able to make knowledgeable choices and best located to make
cost-benefit analyses. Third, acknowledgement of the three arguments
listed at the beginning of this paragraph, all focusing on cost
minimization, shows once again the dual thrust of the Coase theorem.
On the one hand, rights and liability are said to be irrelevant, yet on
the other, the placement of liability is said to be important. The
88. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1096-1097. Cf. Tribe, supra note 36, at 86-87.

January 1974]

THE STUDY OF LA WAND ECONOMICS

theorem has it both ways only because it inadequately describes
reality, i.e., liability rules do affect costs and that is more significant
than the contrived neutrality. Fourth, the critical problem begged by
the cost minimization line of reasoning is whose interests are
recognized as costs. Clearly there is circularity, if cost minimization is
conducted using the status quo cost-price structure, when that
structure is a partial function of rights and liability placements, and
when the critical policy issue is not whose do count but whose should
89
count, e.g., in real property registration and transfer systems. Cost
minimization always has to be juxtaposed to propositions governing
whose interests are to count as costs to others and which therefore
should not be excluded through minimization. Here is where rights
(and liability placements) come in, and here is where the Coasian
analysis is deficient. 90 There is no more justification in saying that in
perfectly working markets there are no transaction costs, than in
saying there are no costs. Transaction costs, no less than nontransaction costs, represent interests, too, and do so through various
legal arrangements. Fifth, it may be the case that cost minimization
would be tantamount to letting the stronger party win. 9 1 As Calabresi
and Melamed put it, the argument of minimizing the administrative
costs of enforcement "will never justify any result except that of
letting the stronger win, for obviously that result minimizes enforce92
ment costs."
1. FurtherAllocative Considerations.
The foregoing analyses have shown several major respects in which
rights are not allocatively neutral. The operation of the principles
involved therein severely constrain, if not eclipse and reverse, the
thrust of the Coase theorem in regard to neutrality. In addition, there
are other allocative considerations that operate to severely qualify the
thrust of the Coase theorem, several of which have been touched on
earlier. First, there are the effective assumptions of zero income
elasticity of demand; 93 the absence of inflexible capital constraints, or
the zero cost of capital; and the long run survival of the firm, 94 which
involves the knotty problem of long run rent, among other things. 95
89. Cf. Hite, et al., The Economics of Environmental Quality 83-84 (1972), and papers by
Tarlock, Gibson, Johnstone, and Payne (and the references given) in Perspectives on Property,
supra note 1.
90. Randall, Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice, supra note 3, at
182; and On the Theory of Market Solutions to Externality Problems, supra note 3, at 47.
91. Stronger, that is, given the status quo rights structure.
92. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1093; cf. 1096-1097.
93. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1095 n. 14; and Randall, supra note 3 and 6.
94. Weld, supra note 72, at 24, 25; M ishan, ParetoOptimality and the Law, supra note 74.
95. Randall, supra note 3 and 6.
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Second, there is the question of whether the marginal curve is the
critical curve for analysis, rather than alternative total cost curves,
with their corresponding marginal curves (including the complexities
of alternative configurations of costs based upon alternative configurations of rights). After all, as Coase says, the problem has to be looked
at both in total and at the margin. Third, there is the problematical
short run and long run symmetry between compensation and bribes. 96
Fourth, there are a whole host of differences made operative by
different liability rules, such as research and development consequences,9 7 differences in the specifics of risk aversion and assumption, 98 differences in the marginal utility of money, 99 differences
in liquidity and other asset limitations upon the capacity to bribe and
the receptivity to bribes, differences in the propensity to create
externalities, 10 0 and so on. 1 1 Finally, there are the reemployment
effects of resources displaced by any utilization of lower transaction
cost systems. 102
THE PLACE OF THE COASE THEOREM IN
LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY
The historical significance of the Coase theorem is that it brought
within orthodox economic theory 10 3 the explicit consideration of
important institutional factors, specifically legal rights and liability
rules. The Coasian analysis, derived from orthodox neoclassical
microeconomics and welfare economics, is seminal in this respect at
least. Its strength, however, is also the source of its profound
limitations. The total Coasian tradition represents a feat of intellectual ingenuity, but how much does it contribute to legal-economic
analysis and policy?
1. The Coase theorem is a blend of normative and positive analysis
and is therefore primarily a normative proposition. The almost
religious devotion shown by its advocates 104 is coupled with an aura
96. Tybout, Pricing Pollution and Other Negative Externalities, 3 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci.
252 (1972), and other references given.
97. Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 Geo, L. J. 869, 871; cf. 872, 873, 876.
See also Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, supra note 73,
at 23; and Pareto Optimality and the Law, supra note 74.
98. d'Arge & Schulze, supra note 82, at 12, 14.
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id.; and Mishan, supra note 59.
101. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, supra note 73,
at 21ff. & passim.; Samuels, supra note 1, at 141-143.
102. Compare Demsetz, Wealth Distributionand the Ownership of Rights, I J. Leg. Studies
223-224 (1972).
103. Percontra, see Samuels, The Scope of Economics Historically Considered, 48 Land Econ.
248 (1972), and supra note 50, 237ff, and the references given in note 117, infra.
104. See, e.g,, Worcester, Jr. A Note on "'The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An
InterpretiveEssay, " 10 J. Econ. Literature 57-8 (1972).

January 19741

THE STUDY OF LA I AND ECONOMICS

of science for what is primarily a normative or ideological principle.
This goes deeper than simply adding a normative premise to an
otherwise positive proposition or converting an is proposition into an
ought.10 5 The Coasian analysis is itself fundamentally an ought
analysis, and its policy inferences that appear to be derived from an is
analysis are really derived from ought premises underlying it. 10 6 At
best, the Coase theorem is an example of analysis in the gray area at
the border between theory as explanation and theory as legitimation.
07
For all practical purposes, the Coasian analysis is power-thought,
with evocative qualities more akin to ideology than to science.
2. The Coase theorem involves ideological symbol manipulation.
The theorem has fit into and reenforced that frame of mind which
defines economics in terms of the market and further only in terms of
resource allocation, and which rationalizes market adjustments of
conflicts without deep or with only selective attention to the structure
of power operating through the market. It is part of the libertarian
tradition which glorifies the market and denigrates government but
which has its own agenda for the state, an agenda which appears to
many to be specific to the interests of certain classes. The theorem
represents a new chapter in the use of the economic mode of
reasoning to support an ostensibly hlissez faire approach to the use of
government. It is part of the apologetics and theology of the market
and of private property, or more specifically, of those institutions as
they have developed primarily in the United States. It is part of the
Chicago (formerly Austrian) approach to economics, now directed at
the study of law and economics, using economic theory in whatever
way it will safely contribute. It thereby builds in selected facets of the
status quo, legitimizing selected status quo rights and/or selected
rights introduced in the name of market creation and efficiency. That
is to say, it gives a privileged status to status quo rights such that they
would be changed only with a unanimity rule except as manipulated
by safe Coasian policy makers. It attempts to provide and rationalize
a particular and ambiguous, but presumably safe, normative answer
to the problem of externalities. The fantasy aspects of the analysis are
to be understood at least partially against this background. If one
were to query as to why, if liability placement does not affect
allocation, there should be so much concern over the Pigovian model,
the answer-in addition to the obvious analytical and policy factors
(e.g., the Pigovian model prejudices choice against the pollutor)-re105. Compare Worcester, supra note 104, at 57, with Mishan, supra note 59, at 60 n. 4.
106. See Samuels, You Cannot Derive "Ought" from "Is," 83 Ethics 159 (1973). One problem
is the selectiveness and therefore incompleteness of the relevant normative analysis; another is
the presumptiveness yet implicit nature of its normative analysis.
107. W. Hutt, Economists and the Public (Cape, 1936).
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sides in the anti-state animus of the Paretian-Coasian tradition. Pigou,
in short, must be discredited and shunted aside for the same reason as
Keynes. He opened too many doors to unsafe, potentially radical,
governmental activism. Even if one is sympathetic to the pro-market
point of view, one nevertheless must acknowledge the Coase theorem
and its limits in this light.
3. Analytically, the Coase theorem represents a partial equilibrium
model and chain of reasoning inclusive only of a selected subset of the
variables involved in the interrelation of legal and economic
processes. 10 8 And this subset is manipulated in a particular way. The
theorem must be comprehended within a general equilibrium system
of choice and power in which market exchange is both a dependent
and independent variable along with rights and the capacity to
generate initial externalities and to participate in externality solutions, especially (but not solely) of the market type, as well as in the
market per se. Caution must be exercised. If partial equilibrium
models can profoundly distort and limit 10 9 the key features of the
complex totality involved, so can general equilibrum models. As Hahn
has written, "Equilibrium economics, because of its well known
welfare economic implications, is easily convertible into an apologia
for existing economic arrangements, and it is frequently so converted."' 110 General equilibrium models must be used with care to
maintain their positive quality, and especially in such a way as to
serve the heuristic function of revealing and enabling the exploration
of deep problems and processes necessarily not reached by partial
equilibrium models. What the Coase theorem represents, unfortunately, is the taking of a partial equilibrium proposition, one generated in
a particular way to particular normative ends, for a general equi108. Let the allocation of resources be a function of a, b, c ....
n variables, with g
representing the liability rule. The Coase theorem says that the allocation of resources is a
function of the marketization of externalities but that is so only to the extent, ceteris paribus,
that externalities are marketed. The Coase theorem also says that allocation is independent of
the liability rule, g, but other factors affect and/or operate through the liability rule: g can be so
singled out by the Coase theorem only because of its particular handling of the other variables,
whereas the other variables could be so manipulated to make the liability rule appear to be the
critical variable on which allocation is dependent. Thus Calabresi and Melamed urge that
Framework or model building has two shortcomings. The first is that models can
be mistaken for the total view of phenomena, like legal relationships, which are
too complex to be painted in any one picture. The second is that models generate
boxes into which one then feels compelled to force situations which do not truly
fit.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1128.
109. Tribe, supra note 36, at 85-86.
110. Hahn, Some Adjustment Theories, 38 Econometrica 1 (1970); also quoted in E. K. Hunt,
Externalities and Contextualism 10, Working Paper No. 12, Program in Environmental
Economics, University of California, Riverside (1971). The welfare economics implications
reflect the normative premises of the analysis and are tautological therewith.
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librium conclusion, as if it covered the entire field of law and
economics.
There is infinitely more to the study of law and economics than can
be studied completely by either the conventional normative or
positive use of the models of neoclassical microeconomics and welfare
economics, the Coase theorem in particular. Because of the narrow
scope of variables considered relevant, if for no other reason, these
models do not adequately analyze the complexities of the interrelations between legal and economic processes, especially the resolution
of the problem of order."' They give exaggerated weight to the
is
resource allocation problem, 112 while the distributional element 113
given obscured and incomplete as well as question-begging effect.
These models given an incomplete account of law as an economic
alternative, as a vehicle for achieving private and collective economic
goals. They present a distorted part of the larger picture of the field of
law and economics which must include analyses of power as a
function of rights and rights as a function of power, analyses of the
modes of legal participation in economic decision making, and
analyses of the modes of legal resolution of economic policy issues.
They make an important stab, through the Coasian analysis, at
understanding legal-economic phenomena (discounting for the moment its primary normative or ideological standing), but they do so in
such a way as to foreclose, within the terms of the theorem and its
assumptions, analysis of the really deep problems of law and
economics. Yet the Coase theorem-though not in the hands of the
Coasians-paradoxically shows the importance of the role of government despite its formal neutrality proposition. Inadvertently, it helps
to pinpoint the importance of the role of legal choice in regard to
resource allocation and the formation and distribution of economic
welfare. Objective analysis of the Coase theorem, which would
function to rationalize the market as the distributional mechanism of
economic welfare, reveals the deep and critical role of government in
that distribution. The Coasian analysis, broadly contemplated, opens
the door to the problems of which structure of property rights and
liability exposures is desirable, whose interests are to be made costs to
others through rights and rights-equivalents, and how the socioeconomic-political-legal decisions with respect thereto are made.
Moreover, the Coasian analysis, again broadly contemplated, points
to the use of the state to change legal rights to improve transactions
111. Samuels, supra note 46, at 448-450.
112. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, supra note 73,
at 26.
113. Samuels, supra note 1, at 141, 143 & passim.
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systems, to create new Pareto-efficient opportunities not hitherto
possible, and to rearrange the conditions for the acquisition and use of
power in the market, albeit not necessarily on terms or in ways or
directions congenial to the Coasians. Despite the neutrality proposition, the Coasian analysis ineluctably points to the absolute importance of the processes of determining legal rights and liabilities of
economic significance. This is no mean feat, though it was hardly part
of the intentions of the Coasians.
4. The Coase theorem abstracts from the ways in which rights and
liability rules have allocative effect and then concludes that rights and
liability rules are neutral in regard to allocation. But rights are not
allocatively neutral, allocation is not independent of rights. The
Coase theorem is only one of several chains of reasoning articulating
the relations of rights to allocation. It is only one of several discernible
principles and not the most important. Some of these other principles,
stated generally, are:
a. Rights enable and structure participation in the economic
decision making process.
b. Resource allocation is a function of the structure and
distribution of rights.
c. Allocation is a function of the transaction system and costs
generated by particular liability rules.
d. Regulation is functionally equivalent to rights in structuring
power and governing allocation.
e. Costs are a function of rights, governing whose interests will
count as a cost to others.
f. Externalities and externality solutions are a function of the
power structure which is a function of rights.
These are all stated as partial equilibrium propositions. Alternatively,
they can be stated as parts of what are called above general
equilibrium dualisms; each functional relationship is only a partial
functional relationship. They point to the overriding importance of
such additional themes as: efficiency specific to the power of
opportunity-set structure; power play over rights and rules, including
the capacity to generate initial externalities and to shift costs to
others, as a critical process; the selectivity of cost inclusion; the limits
of analysis which only gives effect to the rights antecedent to the costs
used in the analysis; and so on. These principles and themes are more
descriptively and analytically important than the Coase theorem.
They warrant careful study and so do numerous other facets of the
interrelations between legal and economic processes. For example,
far more important and revealing than the Coasian analysis would be
objective explorations into the factors and forces which govern which
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non-Pareto optimal legal and non-legal changes are made subject to
compensation and which are not. Such a study would reach truly
fundamental aspects of law and economics.
5. The Coasian analysis is also inconclusive in regard to legal policy
dealing with rights and externalities. It begs or gives an incomplete if
not distorted or normative answer to the problem of whose interests
are to count through legal rights that are necessarily antecedent and
specific to optimal solutions. It suggests that legal rights are irrelevant
at the same time that, broadly contemplated, it suggests opportunity
for re-distributive measures without necessarily having adverse consequences for allocative efficiency. If the meaning of the Coasian
analysis is to consider the total effects of alternative legal and other
arrangements, then the Coase theorem tends to abort the asking of
broad and deep questions concerning the policy implications or
premises of such alternatives. After all, the Coase theorem has been
held to say that rights are allocatively neutral and are a relatively
minor matter. As for externalities, the Coasian analysis is articulated
and explicated in terms of tautologies, and the real world phenomena
and problems of market failures are countered by the Coasian
analysts' "description" of how things would work out if markets were
"perfect." The market cannot resolve all externalities, and where it
can internalize an externality it does not do so in such a way that
allocation is independent of rights and liability rules. The market may
adjust rights, and adjustment-biased allocation may tend to be
independent of liability rules, but in most if not all cases allocation
will be influenced by liability placement and associated transaction
costs, and more importantly, also by the power structure generated by
the entire spectrum of rights of economic significance.
Coase wrote of the Pigovian doctrine that "Not being clear, it was
never clearly wrong."' 1 4 One could say the same thing about the
Coase theorem or doctrine, though perhaps it would be more
accurate to say in its case that given the way it manipulates variables,
it is primarily symbol manipulation. The theorem is not wrong; worse,
it is severely incomplete and misleading yet with the appearance of
final truth. It is the grand tautology of welfare economics and bids to
be the same of law and economics. Legal-economic policy makers and
analysts must be careful about overgeneralization to policy from any
theorem based on narrow assumptions as to what would be the case
when the limits embodied in those assumptions do not square with the
real world wherein the problems are precisely those eliminated by the
assumptions, when the normative conclusions of the theorem are
114. Coase, supra note 23, at 39.
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tautological or circular with ambiguous premises built into supposedly straightforward reasoning, and where there is much room for
selective perception and inclusion of rights, government, costs, and so
on. Such a theorem is the Coase theorem.
6. I shall conclude with these comments.
The Coase theorem is a good example of the proposition that the
value and meaningfulness of any analytical tool or principle is a
function of both its strengths and weaknesses. The Coase theorem is
an important proposition, but it has its limits, which are very
confining. Its meaningfulness and significance must be comprehended
by juxtaposition to other principles some of which, by a curious
inversion generated by an objective analysis of the theorem, reverse
the very thrust of the theorem itself. The Coase theorem has been a
significant contribution and has served to crystalize and legitimize the
field of law and economics. The field will bear further exploration.
Research into the economics of property rights is still in its initial
stage, and many questions remain to be explored. 115 In time, however,
law and economics will generate their own paradigms and will
graduate from the present dominance of "the economics of" to a
corpus of analysis which will incorporate and apply a wide range of
theories and models. The present "economic" approach is dominated
by a narrow (Chicago-Austrian) approach to a narrow aspect or
problem (allocation). There is more to both economics and law and
economics than can be accommodated by such an approach, 116
particularly when it more resembles an economic theology than
science.
There are other traditions in the explorations of property rights and
the interrelation of legal and economic processes. 117 The ChicagoAustrian approach is not the only approach and indeed is not an
approach that can readily reach the deepest problems of law and
economics considered as a positive inquiry (except when developed
with the breadth and honesty of a Frank Knight), in part because of
the normative preoccupations and ambitions which channel its
inquiries and conclusions. Law and economics deal with a complex
set of deep problems with respect to which the Chicago-Coasian
approach represents only one particular normative position. The
study of law and economics must not have its consciousness either
constricted or monopolized by casuistic theories and approaches
115. Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 24, at 1142. As an agenda, see Schmid, Analytical
InstitutionalEconomics, 54 Am. J. Agr. Econ. (1972).
116. Samuels, supra note 103.
117. Samuels, Legal-Economic Policy: A Bibliographical Survey, 58 Law Library J. 230
(1965), and Legal-Economic Policy: A BibliographicalSurvey, 1965-1972, 66 Law Library J. 96
(1973).
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which inhibit or normatively channel consideration of the important
issues and deep problems, whatever position one personally may take
on them. The study of law and economics must not become the
prisoner of the ideology to end ideologies. 118 The legal rules of the
game" 9 are too important in regard to both the conduct and the
results of legal-economic or economic activity. They are not neutral
except to those who prefer to fail to see the important respects in
which they discriminate and/or are used to discriminate. The central
problems of the field of law and economics are all characterized by
existential choice, sometimes constrained by past choices. The Coase
theorem performs its greatest disservice by obscuring the dimensions,
possibilities and consequences of what choices are in fact made.

118. J. Robinson, Economic Philosophy 53 (1962); quoted in Hunt, supra note 110, at 13.
119. Robinson, supra note 118, at 124 ff.

